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Abstract:The evolution of modern mobile devices towards novel 
Radio Frequency (RF) capabilities, such as Near Field 
Communication, leads to a potential for delivering innovative 
mobile services, which is still partially unexplored. Mobile 
proximity payment systems are going to enhance the daily 
shopping experience, but the access to payment security 
resources of a mobile device (e.g. the “Secure Element”) by third 
party applications is still blocked by smartphone and Operating 
System manufacturers. In this paper, the IDA-Pay system is 
presented, an innovative and secure NFC micro-payment system 
based on Peer-to-Peer NFC operating mode for Android mobile 
phones. It allows to deliver mobile-to-POS micro-payment 
services, bypassing the need for special hardware. A validation 
scenario and a system evaluation are also reported to 
demonstrate the system effectiveness and performance. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Recently, mobile devices are playing a very important role 
in linking humans and networks. Currently, a mobile phone 
can be used to update Facebook status, check-in to physical 
places, share digital music, and more yet to come. In 
particular, mobile payments are receiving special attention 
from a number of business actors: bank institutions, telecom 
operators, shopkeepers, technology providers, and so on [1]. 
Mobile payments involve two different areas: 
• the Mobile Remote Commerce, i.e. the buying and 
selling of goods and services through the use of the 
smartphone (or similar devices); 
• the Mobile Proximity Payment, i.e. the using of the 
smartphone to enable proximity payments. 
The adoption of Near Field Communication (NFC) 
technology in today’s smartphones is essential for the delivery 
of mobile proximity payments. NFC follows exactly the 
Internet of Things (IoT) paradigm, as it is considered the 
double-click of the IoT[2]. Cisco has designed an 
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infographic[3] that offers a simple example of how IoT will 
affect our everyday life. It states that by 2020, there will be 50 
billion “things” connected to the Internet - everything from 
our body, car, alarm clock and even cows. 
The special interest of Google’s Android towards NFC is 
favoring the spread of smartphones with embedded NFC 
readers; such devices are becoming popular and they are going 
to play a fundamental role in people’s life, as they allow to 
supply a wide range of ubiquitous applications such as: access 
control, consumer electronics, healthcare, information 
collection and exchange, loyalty and coupons, payments and 
ticketing. 
Mobile phones create a lot of secure and convenient 
conditions for payment operations, e.g., battery, keyboard, 
screen, storage, and 3G network. In future, these smartphones 
will represent the personal electronic wallet (e-wallet) for most 
people replacing the current plastic credit cards. 
However NFC payments are yet to attain to their market 
potential [4]. This is mainly because only Google’s Android 
[5] has reached a significant share of the NFC mobile market. 
Moreover, only the Google Wallet mobile application supports 
NFC micro-payments in the US for Android mobile phones. 
Third party applications cannot take advantage of the security 
resources embedded in Android devices because Google 
Wallet is the unique application having privileged access to 
such resource, namely the “Secure Element” (SE). The SE is a 
special memory area where trusted applications can store and 
retrieve sensitive user information, such as the credit card 
number and the Card Verification Value (CVV) code. 
Furthermore, Google Wallet is limited to work with affiliated 
credit card issuers (e.g. MasterCard, Visa), so no chance is 
given to alternative payment ecosystems. 
The research work summarized in this paper aims to 
develop an innovative mobile micro-payment system which 
can be easily used in alternative ecosystems to implement 
custom payment scenarios. Such system must ensure the same 
security level of traditional credit card payments, without the 
need of any hardware intervention (SIM or SD cards 
replacement) by smartphone’s owners. That is, the user has 
only to download the application from the market and install it 
onto the device. Moreover, multiple payment networks (e.g. 
credit cards, money transfer, couponing) should be easily 
configurable. Finally, the interaction between the user and the 
system must be bi-directional, so the system can return rich 
collectible feedbacks to the user. 
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To achieve the abovementioned goals, a security 
architecture based on both symmetric and asymmetric 
encryption was designed. In our system, the end-user can 
securely access innovative and unlimited mobile services by 
waving his/her smartphone proximate to an ad-hoc NFC Point-
Of-Sale (POS). We called our system IDA-Pay, as it was 
designed and developed in the IDA Lab (IDentification 
Automation Laboratory) of University of Salento (Italy). The 
system was validated in our laboratory (in vitro) considering 
the raised requirements; an effective validation (in vivo) with 
real actors has not been performed yet as it represents a future 
work. 
This paperextends ourprevious work [6]including a 
performance evaluation of the proposed secure NFC micro-
payment system in order to demonstrate mainly 
itseffectiveness. 
This paper is organized as follows. In section II, an 
overview about NFC technology and standards is given. 
Section III reports the state of the art related to security issues 
in NFC mobile payments. Presentation and discussion about 
the IDA-Pay secure architecture are outlined in section IV. 
Section V discusses about implementation issues and 
strategies, as well as presenting a validation scenario. A 
qualitative and quantitative system evaluation is reported in 
Section VI. Finally, section VII summarizes our key messages 
and sketches future research directions.  
II. OVERVIEW ON NFC TECHNOLOGY 
NFC is a short-range wireless technology derived from the 
Radio Frequency IDentification (RFID) [7][8] family which, 
even if is widely diffused and adopted in applications even 
quite far from the canonical ones related to logistics[9]-[14], it 
is not adequate for micro-payments. NFC has been 
standardized and promoted by Sony, Philips and Nokia, which 
founded the NFC Forum [15] in 2004. To date, the NFC 
Forum boasts more than 160 members. 
NFC is based on inductive-coupling, where loosely coupled 
inductive circuits share power and data over a distance of a 
few centimeters (i.e. less than 5 cm). NFC devices inherit the 
basic technology of proximity such as RFID tags in High 
Frequency (HF) band (i.e., 13.56 MHz) and contactless 
smartcards, but they have a number of key new features. 
The specification for NFC is given by ISO/IEC 18092 NFC 
IP-1 [16] and ISO/IEC 14443 [17] contactless smartcard 
standards. According to such standards, NFC offers three 
different operating modes, illustrated in Fig.1: 
1. Reader/Writer mode. The NFC device is capable of 
reading NFC Forum-mandated tag types. The 
reader/writer mode on the RF interface is compliant to 
the ISO 14443 and FeliCa schemes. 
2. Card Emulation mode. The device can emulate an 
existing contactless card without adaptors in the 
existing payment infrastructure. A card and a tag are 
technically the same; however, contactless cards used 
in e-ticketing and payment today include additional 
technology to store secure data. 
3. Peer-to-Peer (P2P) mode. Two active NFC devices can 
exchange data, such as virtual business cards or digital 
photos. P2P mode is standardized on the ISO/IEC 
18092 specification. 
NFC always involves an initiator and a target; the initiator 
actively generates an RF field that can power a passive target 
(e.g. tags, stickers, cards) or an active target as well (i.e. a 
second NFC reader). Available bit rates for NFC are 
106/216/414 Kbps. 
Data stored into NFC passive targets follows the NFC Data 
Exchange Format (NDEF) Forum specification [18]. NDEF is 
a binary message format that can be used to encapsulate one or 
more application-defined payloads, which may be of a variety 
of types and sizes. The format and the rules for building 
standard record types in NDEF messages are included in NFC 
Record Type Definition (RTD) Technical Specifications [19]. 
Four specific RTDs are available: Text, URI, Smart Poster, 
and Generic Control. 
The exchange of data between two active targets (P2P) 
takes place on top of the Logical Link Control Protocol 
(LLCP) [20]. LLCP is an OSI layer-2 compact protocol, based 
on the industry standard IEEE 802.2, designed to support 
either small applications or network protocols. Google 
released the Android NDEF Push Protocol (NPP) [21], a 
simple open protocol built on top of LLCP which is designed 
to push an NDEF message from a NPP client to a NPP server 
(one way). A device that supports NPP always run an NPP 
server, and may run a NPP client as well. This allows for bi-
directional NDEF exchange between NPP devices. 
III. RELATED WORKS 
Working in card emulation mode implies to access the SE. 
It plays a key role in the security management, as it hosts the 
firewalled applications and user credentials, and it controls 
security and cryptography using an onboard microprocessor 
and software. 
There are three ways to implement the SE: 
1. In the SIM. This has the advantage of portability, and 
is the preferred approach in GSM countries; the 
drawback is that the user must use a special purpose 
SIM. 
2. Embedded SE component. This is a separate chipset in 
the handset. Its main advantage is that it is convenient 
for handset manufacturers to implement quickly. The 
drawback is that handset and OS manufacturers rule 
the access to the SE. 
3. A removable SE component. This is a theoretical 
 
Fig. 1.  NFC operating modes and standards 
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approach to create a removable separate chipset in the 
handset; often it is implemented as a SD card. Again, 
the drawback is that the user must use special 
hardware. 
The embedded SE solution is adopted in Android NFC 
mobile phones. Samsung’s Nexus S, Galaxy Nexus, and 
Galaxy S III have this feature implemented in the PN65N NFC 
chipset, which includes the SE. However the Android NFC 
APIs do not provide SE software interfaces, except for the 
Google Wallet application, that can work in card emulation 
mode and rely on the existing payment infrastructure. 
In literature, some attempts to address such limits exist. In 
[22], the first experiment of a NFC-based payment application 
fully supporting the EMV (Europay, MasterCard and VISA) 
international standard [23] is described. In this solution, the 
SE is embedded within a special SIM card. The same 
approach is used in [24], where Nokia NFC mobile phones use 
special SIM cards to guarantee privacy and security in car 
parking payment transactions in Italy. Other interesting SIM-
based solutions are proposed in [25]-[28]. 
In [29], the pros and cons of combining NFC with the SIM 
card in the handsets are described. Although the technology 
itself is already working properly, the authors admit that the 
processes for integration of both into one mobile device still 
need time. At present, it is necessary for the users to replace 
their own SIM card with new ones. Moreover, SE itself is not 
completely threat-safe, as its centralized logic may be object 
of Denial of Service (DoS) and Relay attacks [30][31]. 
IV. SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE 
In IDA-Pay, P2P mode is used to transfer payment 
information between the Android NFC smartphone and the 
POS. The forced choice to use P2P suffers the major drawback 
of not being compatible with the existing NFC POS 
infrastructure; nevertheless, EMV virtual POS services are 
offered almost by every bank. Moreover, the choice to use P2P 
mode instead of card emulation leads to several benefits, e.g. 
the user can receive customizable confirmations onto his/her 
smartphone, so s/he can keep track of the payments at any 
time (even when off-line). 
In Fig. 2, the high level IDA-Pay system architecture is 
shown. In particular: 
1. The client is an Android NFC smartphone with the 
IDA-Pay App installed on. In IDA-Pay client, there is 
no need for a SE, as the sensitive information for every 
configured credit card is stored in a secure file placed 
in the smartphone’s memory, which is called the Credit 
Card File (CCF).  
2. The IDA-Pay POS is a desktop client connected to the 
Internet. It has also an NFC interface and runs the 
IDA-Pay POS application to exchange payments data 
with the buyer. 
3. The IDA-Pay Gateway (GW) is a Web server that 
forwards the payment request incoming from the IDA-
Pay POS to the right Credit Card Network (CCN) 
endpoint (e.g. an EMV compliant virtual POS).  
The security architecture designed for IDA-Pay follows in 
Dominikus’s footsteps [32]. 
When a payment is requested, the user inserts a PIN and the 
CCF is passed to the IDA-Pay POS through a NFC P2P link. 
The CCF encrypts a plain text credit card file M containing the 
device ID, the credit card number, the month/year of 
expiration and the CVV. The device ID is the phone’s 
fingerprint; it is used to hard-link the CCF with the 
smartphone, so the CCF, if stolen, cannot be used by any 
different device. It is calculated by combining hardware 
information such as the smartphone’s CPU serial number and 
the Bluetooth card MAC address. 
In order to ensure confidentiality, only the IDA-Pay GW 
should be able to understand the CCF; so it is obtained by 
encrypting the M file using a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI). 
When a new credit card is configured in the IDA-Pay App, the 
M file is encrypted using the IDA-Pay public key (ePub) and 
the CCF is created. The used encryption algorithm is the RSA 




The encrypted message resides on the smartphone’s 
memory, so it may be subject of spoofing attacks. The user 
authentication is necessary when the access to MPub is 
requested. For this reason we used an additional level of 
encryption based on the symmetric key algorithm AES, where 
the 128 bits key kPIN is computed on the basis of a 5 digits seed 





Such process is modeled in the card configuration 
interaction scenario (Fig. 3). In Fig. 4, the payment interaction 
scenario is shown. When a new payment is requested, the user 
selects a configured credit card on its Android smartphone and 
the IDA-Pay App prompts the user to re-type the PIN. The 
kPINsymmetric key is re-computed, so it can be used to try to 
decrypt the CCF. If the PIN is right, MPub is obtained and it is 
ready to be transferred to the requesting POS through the NFC 
 
Fig. 2.  The IDA-Pay architecture 
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P2P link, along with the recomputed device ID. The IDA-Pay 
POS works as a relayer, as it forwards the CCF, the device ID 
and the payment amount to the IDA-Pay GW in the POST 
body of a SOAP message. The SOAP request is transferred by 
using a Secure Socket Layer (SSL) tunnel. After the device ID 
has been validated, the gateway can extract the M plain file 
using the IDA-Pay private key ePriv and it forwards the 
payment request to the right credit network (e.g. a virtual 
EMV POS). 
V. IMPLEMENTATION AND VALIDATION 
The IDA-Pay App prototype was implemented and 
validated by using a Samsung Nexus S mounting Android 
4.1.2 (i.e., Jelly Bean version). We chose this smartphone 
model because the Nexus S was the first Android device to 
support NFC in both hardware and software. In our opinion, it 
represents the best trade-off between performances and cost; 
the double-level encryption process is almost instantaneous on 
the Nexus S’ ARM Cortex A8 CPU (see section VI). The 
package javax.crypto from Android SDK was used in order to 
produce the CCF. 
The IDA-Pay POS prototype uses a SCM Microsystems 
SCL3711 USB Dongle NFC reader, as it is the best-supported 
reader by NFCPY software libraries [33]. We used such 
libraries because they were the most advanced NFC P2P 
desktop libraries at the time of implementation (Jan. 2012). 
NFCPY libraries are written in Python and they implement the 
Google’s NPP specifications. 
However, NFCPY are still a work in progress and the latest 
release (1.0 at the time of implementation) was still buggy. In 
particular, we had to solve a problem occurring when 
switching NPP client and server roles between the smartphone 
and the SCL3711. Such switching was needed for receiving 
feedbacks from the POS, as at the first phase of the payment 
the communication flows from smartphone to SCL3711, while 
at the second phase it flows from SCL3711 to smartphone. 
The SCL3711 could not switch from server to client role 
because it remained pending, waiting for other NDEF 
messages incoming from the smartphone. Our fix let the 
connections be closed when data exchange between the two 
NFC devices is terminated. 
In the IDA-Pay POS implementation, NFCPY are wrapped 
in a Java standalone program, in order to follow the Android 
philosophy. However, the Python runtime environment must 
be installed on the POS machine.  
The IDA-Pay GW exposes a set of Web services through 
the Tomcat servlet container. In order to support multiple 
CCNs, the Abstract Factory design pattern [34] was used, thus 
it is simple to implement multiple concrete adaptors for 
different CCNs, with no effort in re-engineering the code. 
In Fig. 5, the validation scenario is reported. Here we 
assume that one (at least) credit card has been configured by 
the buyer into his own smartphone. In particular: 
1. The cashier inserts and confirms the amount into the 
IDA-Pay POS application (Fig. 6.a) and tells the buyer 
to touch his NFC Android smartphone to the POS NFC 
reader. 
2. The buyer starts the IDA-Pay App and taps a credit 
card from the configured credit card list (Fig. 6.b). The 
 
Fig. 3.  The card configuration interaction scenario 
 
 
Fig. 4. The payment interaction scenario 
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App prompts the buyer to insert the correspondent 
PIN, and then asks the buyer to touch the smartphone 
to the POS NFC reader (Fig. 6.c). 
3. Payment details are transferred to the IDA-Pay GW. 
4. The IDA-Pay GW instantiates a payment transaction 
with the right CCN. 
5. The GW receives the result from the CCN. 
6. The result is formatted and returned to the IDA-Pay 
POS, where it is shown to the cashier. 
7. A plain text response is created and sent back to the 
buyer’s smartphone through the NFC P2P link. A 
message dialog notifies the buyer that the payment has 
been sent successfully and that he can move the 
smartphone away from the POS NFC reader. The 
payment response is stored into the payments’ archive 
(Fig. 6.d). 
 
From step 3 to step 6 (included), it is not mandatory for the 
buyer to keep its smartphone in touch with the POS NFC 
reader. It is possible because after the information is 
transferred from the smartphone to the POS (step 2), the P2P 
role of the smartphone switches from ‘initiator’ to ‘target’; in 
this state, the IDA-Pay app remains pending (Fig. 6.c), waiting 
for data incoming from the NFC interface. During this period 
of time, the buyer can remove the smartphone from the 
POS.However, it still remains mandatory for the buyer to keep 
the IDA-Pay app active in the foreground of the smartphone 
during this phase (application must not be closed).Step 7 will 
be accomplished as soon as the NFC smartphone will be in 
range.The buyer can close the application when step 7 is 
finished. 
During the full payment process, it is not necessary for the 
buyer to be connected to the Internet. The Internet connection 
is only needed in the card configuration phase (see Fig. 3) 
VI. EVALUATION 
In this section, a rigorous system evaluation is 
presented,both quantitative and qualitative. 
A. Setup and Methods 
In our experiment, the IDA-Pay app is running on a 
Samsung I9023 Nexus S with Android 4.1.2 (Jelly Bean) and a 
1 GHz ARM Cortex A8 Hummingbird CPU.  Anyway, further 
Android devices (even not NFC-powered) have been used (see 
Table I) to demonstrate the IDA-Pay crypt engine 
performances. Both the IDA-Pay POS and GW are running on 
the same 64-bit Ubuntu 12.04 LTS with an Intel Core2 Duo 
CPU T9600 @ 2.80GHz, 512MB RAM, OpenJRE Java 6, and 
Apache Tomcat 6, virtualized with VMware Fusion on a late 
2008 Apple MacBook Pro. 
In order to simulate the network latency during the payment 
experience, an artificial cumulative delay TD was introduced in 
the system. We define the Round Trip Time (RTT) as the 
length of time it takes for a payment instance to be sent plus 
the length of time it takes for the feedback to be received on to 





• TSEND is the amount of time needed to forward the 
payment instance from the smartphone NFC 
interface to the CCN. It is the sum of: 
o TNFCsend, the time needed to move the 
information over the NFC P2P link, from 
the smartphone to the POS; 
o TSSLsend, the time needed to move the 
information over the SSL link, from the 
POS to the IDA-Pay GW; 
o TCCNsend, the time needed to send the 
information to the CCN. 
 






(b)        (c)        (d) 
 
Fig. 6. Some screenshots of the IDA-Pay prototype: (a) the cashier inserts 
the amount into the IDA-Pay POS application, (b) the buyer starts the IDA-
Pay App and taps a credit card from the configured credit card list, (c) the 
app asks the buyer to touch the smartphone to the POS NFC reader, (d) the 
payment response is stored into the payments’ archive. 
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• TELAB is the amount of time needed to process the 
information at different stages. It is the sum of: 
o TPOS, the time to process the information 
at the POS application; 
o TGW, the time to process the information at 
the IDA-Pay GW; 
o TPAY, the time needed to perform the 
transaction by the CCN. 
• TRETURN isthe amount of time needed to forward the 
payment result from the CCN to the smartphone 
NFC interface. It is the sum of: 
o TCCNreturn, the time needed to forward the 
payment result from the CCN to the IDA-
Pay GW; 
o TSSLreturn, the time needed by the payment 
result to go back to the POS through the 
SSL link; 
o TNFCreturn, the time needed by the payment 
result to go back to the smartphone 
through the NFC P2P link. 
 
The RTT does not include the time needed by the buyer for 
inserting the PIN and putting the smartphone close to the POS. 
In our experiments, the values TSSL and TCCN (both send and 
return) are not realistic because of our hardware setup 
(everything is on a PC). So we introduce an artificial 




Such delay time should be distributed among the different 
sub-systems; however, for evaluation purposes, a 
Thread.sleep(TD) has been inserted in the POS 
application.  
The range in which the delay TD falls was estimated in 3-15 
seconds; this range was obtained by a bank services company 
we have consulted, which observed the time experienced by a 
set of credit card customers in real usage scenarios. We have 
considered the full range 0-15 seconds in order to evaluate the 
system in clean setup conditions. We have discretized the 
range in 3 seconds intervals and we have evaluated the 
payment time at every interval. 
 
B. Qualitative evaluation 
In this paragraph, we evaluate the IDA-Pay system from a 
qualitative perspective. In Table II, a summarized comparison 
with similar payment technologies is reported. We have also 
considered remote mobile payment technologies (i.e. QR 
codes and SMS, anyway our considerations can be extended to 
any remote mobile payment technology such as eBay and 
PayPal mobile applications). The table shows that, at the time 
of writing (November 2012), a “perfect” mobile payment 
technology (i.e. without drawbacks) does not exist. Anyway, 
NFC P2P technology got the potential to be the most suitable 
payment technology for the future. Nevertheless, effort in 
standardization and diffusion must be spent. 
In Table III, the risk matrix related to the IDA-Pay micro-
payment system is reported. We used this tool to perform an ‘a 
posteriori’ evaluation about the harm events that can occur to 
the IDA-Pay system and the related amount of harm. 
We assign both the probability of the event (A=Sure, 
B=Probable, C=Improbable, D=Impossible) and the effect 
(A=Disastrous, B=Denial of Service, C=Instability, D=Null). 
In particular, we focus our attention over the risks related with 
the client (IDA-Pay App) and POS sub-systems, which can be 
easily subject of theft, unauthorized access and corruption. 
The designed security system ensures strong threat immunity 
even in the extreme cases of smartphone stealing and 
malicious access. 
 
C. Quantitative evaluation 
In order to test and assess the performance of our micro-
payment system, a campaign of experimentation for measuring 
the average time it takes a payment to be accomplished was 
held. 
The number of repetitions (payments) carried out in order to 
estimate the mean value of TD is able to guarantee a 
confidence interval equal to 95% and a maximum relative 
error less than 5%. As reported in Table IV, the number of 
repetitions is quite variable for each value of TD; moreover, the 
variance is quite variable as well. Such variability is due to the 
partial immaturity of the NFCPY libraries, which let the 
feedback return time be subject to random delay. Anyway, the 
average payment time grows linearly when the delay TD 
increases (Fig. 7); moreover, the percentile 80% is only 
slightly larger than the average for each TD, which means that 
for the 80% of the times the payment time is close to the 
average.In clean setup conditions, the average payment time is 
about 5 seconds.  
We have used further five different Android devices in 
order to demonstrate the efficiency of the IDA-Pay security 
system. The aim of our test is not to select the best Android 
device on which run the IDA-Pay App, but to demonstrate that 
any Android smartphone (even the old ones) can perform the 
double level encryption and decryption in very short time (few 
milliseconds). We obtained an average value over 100 
repetitions of the encode algorithm time on each considered 
smartphone. 
TABLE I 
MAIN FEATURES OF THE CONSIDERED ANDROID DEVICES 
 Samsung Nexus S Galaxy Nexus Acer Liquid mini e310 
Samsung Galaxy S 













1.4GHz single core 
ARM Cortex A8   
1.0GHz 
Qualcomm 
Snapdragon 8250  
1.4GHz quad-core 
Exynos 4  
RAM 512MB 1GB 512MB 512MB 512MB 1GB 
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Fig. 8 shows the encode time histogram; the best 
performance (2ms) is obtained by the Samsung Galaxy SIII, 
equipped with a 1.4GHz quad-core CPU. The worst 
performance (11ms) is obtained by the Acer Liquid Mini 
E310, equipped with a 600MHz single core CPU. 
We have monitored the CPU load during the 100 repetitions 
as well. We have used a third party Android app, 
NetMeter[35], in order to read the CPU peak usage after the 
execution of the 100 repetitions. Fig. 9 reports the results 
obtained by using the preselected smartphones. Beware that in 
Fig. 8 we have reported an average time, while in Fig. 9 we 
show a cumulative load of all the 100 repetitions, i.e. the CPU 
load may be significantly lower in real usage scenarios. As it 
is shown in Fig. 9, the CPU load is never higher than 40-50% 
on every smartphone. In Fig. 10, a NetMeter screenshot 
showingthe full CPU load graph for the Samsung Nexus S is 
depicted. The graph at the bottom is the one showing the CPU 
load. The black vertical arrow points at the peak related to the 
test 
execution time. The two small peaks shown on the left side 
ofthe peak in Fig. 10 are caused by the opening of the IDA-
Pay test activity on to the smartphone. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we have proposed and discussed the IDA-Pay, 
an innovative NFC-based mobile micro-payment system 
architecture and prototype for Android smartphones. In 
literature, several NFC-based micro-payment systems have 
already been presented; in order to avoid the security 
limitations imposed by smartphone and OS manufacturers, 
such works force the user to install additional hardware 
(special SIM or SD cards). Our system is SE-agnostic as it 
adopts NFC P2P mode and can be easily used and customized  
TABLE II 
PROXIMITY AND REMOTE MOBILE PAYMENT TECHNOLOGY COMPARISON 










Type of mobile payment Proximity Proximity Remote Proximity Proximity Remote 
Level of adoption Proprietary 
services 








Compatibility with existing 
POS infrastructure 
NO YES NO YES, but only with 
contactless POS 
YES N.A. 
Can return rich feedbacks YES NO YES NO NO YES 
Is freely implementable YES NO on Android, 
YES on other 
platforms 
YES N.A. (issued by banks and 
credit institutions) 
N.A. (issued by 
banks and credit 
institutions) 
YES 




EFFECT/PROBABILITY RISK MATRIX 
EFFECT:  A=SURE, B=PROBABLE, C=IMPROBABLE, D=IMPOSSIBLE 
PROBABILITY:  A=DISASTROUS, B=DENIAL OF SERVICE, C=INSTABILITY, D=NULL 
Effect/Probability Client POS Gateway server NFC network 
interface 
Credit card data 
Unauthorized access D/B C/C A/C C/C D/C 
Denial of Service C/C C/C B/B B/D B/C 
Theft D/B C/C B/D D/C D/C 
Corruption C/B C/B B/B B/D A/C 
Virus C/B C/B C/C B/D D/D 
Physical damage D/B D/C B/D B/D A/C 
 
TABLE IV 
PAYMENT SYSTEM PERFORMANCE 
TD[s] Number of 
reps 
 
Average [s] Median [s] Min [s] Max [s] Percentile 
80% 
Variance [s2] St. deviation 
[s] 
0 41 4.719 4.514 2.390 9.186 5.651 2,950.427 1.717 
3 31 7.887 7.462 6.231 9.988 8.965 1,089.762 1.043 
6 18 12.205 11.681 11.269 14.993 12.978 1,243.378 1.115 
9 12 14.994 14.510 14.391 17.360 14.881 1,147.403 1.071 
12 15 18.423 17.937 17.142 22.316 19.257 2,209.406 1.486 





Fig. 7. Payment times grow linearly when the network latency increases 
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in alternative micro-payments ecosystems. Nevertheless, 
thesame security level of traditional credit card payments is 
ensured, and the compatibility with popular credit card 
networks is preserved. Moreover, in IDA-Pay the data flow 
between the smartphone and the system is bi-directional, so 
the user can read and collect textual or binary feedbacks. 
Nevertheless, only NFC-enabled smartphones can be used 
in IDA-Pay. Alternative solutions based on NFC stickers or 
QR codes could be considered in order to retrofit the system. 
This paper extends our previous work, by adding a system 
evaluation. The experimental results obtained in this phase 
show a minimum payment time of around 5 seconds in ideal 
conditions; this number grows linearly as the network latency 
increases. The encryption algorithm, used in the validation 
phase to ensure security in the system, is very efficient, as it 
takes only 12 ms on a middle generation Android smartphone. 
The CPU load is never higher that 50% when 100 repetitions 
of the same algorithm are performed. 
We spent our effort in the system validation and evaluation 
through a set of predefined test beds in our laboratory (in 
vitro). The next step is to validate our system in a pilot project 
with real users using the system in real scenarios (in vivo); 
moreover, biometric techniques to identify the cardholder will 
be also taken into account in order to avoid the need of a PIN, 
which can be easily forgotten, lost or stolen. 
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